PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr.: Top Cop in the hot seat

The 10th Chief of the Philippine National Police is a dead shot. Hermogenes E. Ebdane Jr.’s affinity for guns began at a young age. As a boy, Ebdane would construct his own guns using umbrella tubes and rubber bands; unrefined gunpowder propelled the BB pellets. Even then, he rarely missed. Compensating for the crude weapon’s erratic aim, he could still shoot down a bird in flight from three meters. Nowadays, the PNP Director General no longer has the time to practice in the firing range or join shooting competitions, but his reputation for being on target still precedes him. "Modesty aside," he says in his quiet voice, "they still have to find someone who can beat me in precision shooting with an M-16."

It was hardly surprising that the public school principal’s son found his way to the Philippine Military Academy where he armed himself with a degree in Military Science. Ebdane’s progress since graduating has been as steady as his acknowledged demeanor under fire–on the 4th of July this year, he was appointed the nation’s top cop. Next to the presidency, the position occupies the toastiest seat in government. Just a cursory glance at the framed pictures of his predecessors at the PNP Head Office in Camp Crame would have revealed to Ebdane that the last four PNP Chiefs have averaged less than two years each in office.

He met his wife, the former Alma Cabanayan, while he was a cadet in Baguio City. A taciturn, unexcitable man, Ebdane is predictably not a believer in love at first sight–he says the relationship blossomed over time. The PMA is the Ivy League of soldiers and Ebdane soon commanded Philippine Constabulary Units in Pangasinan and Bataan. He was then appointed Chief of Police of Dagupan City before becoming Provincial Commander of Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan.

In a career full of close calls, the closest of them all came during an intelligence operation in Olongapo City in 1976. A former commander of the New People’s Army had been persuaded to spy for the government but could no longer bear the mental strain of playing both sides. The confused rebel lost his head early one morning during breakfast and threatened to shoot the future PNP Chief. Ebdane did not have his gun. "I saw for the first time the big barrel of a .45 pointed at me. I sized up the situation. I realized how bad it was to be on the wrong end of a gun," he recounts.

Ebdane remained calm and the gunman was pacified. The experience edified. "I can say that when you get involved in firefights, you feel hot and your adrenaline is pumping. You have to control your nerves."

When Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency, it became obvious the Presidential Security Group needed a complete overhaul. The group’s deep loyalty to Marcos could not be dismissed and a new PSG was formed to ensure the security of Pres. Aquino. Soldiers were brought to the big city as Ebdane was chosen to lead the Presidential Guard Battalion that constituted two-thirds of the manpower of the PSG. The stint had its episodes of comic relief.

"All the members of the PSG under Marcos were relieved. It was really hard because we started from almost nothing. It took us about two years to complete the cycle of training. One time, some of my men left Malacañang. Shortly after, they called up to say they were lost! I told them to go to the nearest corner and read the street sign. They were at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Carriedo," Ebdane laughs.

In 1989, while Commanding Officer of the PC Special Action Force, Ebdane observed that a fixed-wing aircraft and Sikorsky helicopter had missed their targets during the Balikatan training at Fort Magsaysay. Later that night, a source informed him of an impending coup d’etat over the telephone. He immediately left for Manila to alert Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos. Ebdane would eventually learn that the off-target pilots of both plane and helicopter were at the time already allied with the rebels.

"I called up my classmate, Col. Hernandez of the Presidential Security Group, to inform him about the coup. I was told my information reached the President through Col. Voltainre Gazmin. But when the President called up the other major service commanders to confirm, they denied it. Who was I to be listened to compared to them? But the next day, they found out what I was saying was true."

With two of his companies already buttressing Camp Aguinaldo, Ebdane deployed his remaining troops from Bicutan to Camp Crame. The reinforcements were partly responsible for denying the rebels the psychological advantage of raising their flag at the camp the following day.

"The first contact between the rebel soldiers and the government was between the rebel soldiers of my classmate, Col. Goho, and my shock troopers in Camp Aguinaldo. That was during the first night. The next day, I negotiated with Gen. Blando with the blessing of Sec. Ramos," Ebdane remembers.

After playing a crucial role in quelling the seditious uprising, Ebdane’s career was fast-tracked. He was appointed Regional Director of the National Capital Region, earning him his second star. From there, he became Director for Human Resources and Doctrine Development, Deputy Chief for Administration where he received his third star, and then Chief of the National Anti-Kidnap-For-Ransom Task Force (NAKTAF).

It was in the latter NAKTAF position that Ebdane’s reputation as a kidnapper’s scourge grew. Families of kidnap victims, understandably hesitant about cooperating with the police, learned to trust the poker-faced general who dispensed sensible advice. They appreciated his candid assessments and zero bullshit. NAKTAF was gaining some ground against the slippery criminals.

Then, as if on cue, Pentagon Gang leader Faizal Marohombsar casually escaped from his Camp Crame cell after Ebdane’s appointment as the new PNP Chief was made public. A rash of kidnappings ensued, as if kidnapping syndicates understood the hunting would be lean once the new chief was sworn in. Ebdane, already surly in nature, was livid.

"I was at my quarters (when I heard about the escape). When I was informed, the first thing I asked was–did he escape alone? I immediately went back to the detention center and retraced how he did it. When problems arise, I use what I learned in my Tactical Survival and Adventure Training–I stop what I’m doing, think about the problem, and find out what should be done. In spur of the moment situations, my temper can flare up. But I can still make the right decision," says Ebdane.

After the inauspicious start, a series of kidnapping and carnap syndicates fell in succession during Ebdane’s first few months in office. It was just the result President Macapagal-Arroyo was counting on to feed her orchestrated parade of suspects. Observers, including tough anti-crime crusader Teresita Ang-See, were impressed.

Ebdane is refreshingly candid about the PNP’s errors. "One of the glaring mistakes that we commit is that, to some extent, we do not accept that there is a problem. I conducted research together with some selected officers. We found out that the PNP really has a perception problem. The people believe the PNP is not good. Based on our assessment, perception is almost always the reality."

Indeed, the PNP Chief is not one to treat statistics showing a decline in criminality as gospel truth. It must have taken some soul-searching, but Ebdane came to the conclusion that the public did not feel safe because, in many ways, it wasn’t. To address the PNP’s image problem, Ebdane sought and was given blanket powers by the National Police Commission to purge the PNP. He grasped that the lack of internal discipline was an overriding issue. Ebdane ordered all PNP commanders to submit a comprehensive list of personnel who were awol.

The PNP Chief reached startling–and frank–conclusions regarding scalawags in the service. "First, the problem starts at the recruitment level. There are some recruits taken in who could already have been members of criminal syndicates. Second, during the training, not much attention was given to upgrading the quality of training given to them. Third, the people who were supposed to correct the mistakes were actually assimilated into the situation. There is really a radical need to conduct administrative reductions."

The last point is couched in police-speak, but even the densest policemen will comprehend Ebdane’s meaning–their jobs are on the line. He has also made it clear that he will not tolerate the traditional washing of hands by police commanders.

"We have to provide an atmosphere where the people who belong to the chain of command develop into independent thinkers. They need to make full use of their discretion in managing the affairs of their unit. I used to tell my field commanders that the last thing I want to hear them ask me is what to do about a problem. They must solve their problems.

"One other thing is that the discipline of the personnel should emanate from the unit–the problem should not be passed on to another person. I prohibited the unnecessary transfer of personnel from one unit to another, especially from Luzon to Mindanao. Instead of solving the problem, we are providing them the opportunity to expand their network!"

Lately, the PNP has suffered serious setbacks, the most spectacular being the unsolved kidnap of the children of controversial congressman Jules Ledesma. In the public’s mind, the momentum has once again shifted to the side of the criminals. But many smell something fishy–Ebdane himself questions the motives behind many crimes. He admits the smugness of some criminal groups suggests that the objective is not always the loot. The government is being systematically embarrassed.

"Perhaps the citizenry should know about this. Really, in some circumstances, the actions of these criminals have to be studied further. For example, one group composed of scalawags in uniform conducted not only kidnapping but also assassination. I just wonder why they get involved in kidnapping unless they are out to get resources to further their aims, or maybe to show that the government is inutile.

"Whenever there are incidents where the money involved is not commensurate to the risk taken, then it’s highly suspicious. Like in 1997 and 1998, when there was a series of bank robberies that would only net a couple of thousand pesos. Recently, the robberies in Manila eateries... I can hardly understand why they did it. They exposed themselves for a small amount."

Ebdane predictably declines to speculate about how high up the masterminds go. When he was PNP Deputy Chief, he says, he was a clear target–evidently, powerful personalities did not want him in charge of the PNP. After he assumed the PNP’s top position, "no simple incident could change that situation."

Today, Ebdane believes it is the government that is the target of humiliation. If he is right, it is a terrifying thought–criminals are being strung like puppets by intelligent, devious minds to sow panic and disprove the notion of a strong republic. The collateral damage is mercilessly ignored.

It is not a reassuring time to live in the Philippines; one quickly learns that being in a perpetual state of paranoia is preferable to ending up a naïve victim of crime. Filipinos feel helpless, but Chief Ebdane will not accept this capitulation.

"The problem with us Filipinos is that we always think negative," he says. "We seem to believe we cannot do anything about a problem. The best thing is to make an analysis of the problem and the bottom line is this: if we can convert this fear into something positive, we can preempt these criminal activities. We must be aware of the requirements of security. If you think it’s not secure to use your cellphone, then don’t! Wala kasing ospital para sa kulang sa common sense."

Perhaps he is right. The PNP conducts awareness programs for groups who are considered potential targets such as the Chinese-Filipino community, and the results have been promising. "We tell them we are willing to train a member of the family as a security officer. One (private security person) may not be enough to secure their safety and we cannot provide personnel to each threatened family. There are lots of incidents that have been negated because of this awareness."

The ordinary Filipino will ultimately be disillusioned if he relies on the PNP to play the role of bodyguard. Like the poor, criminals will always be in our midst. But do we really want more cops or simply better ones? Hermogenes Ebdane believes that his force’s crime solution rate of nearly 90% should embolden citizens to report crimes commited against them. It’s a start. If the current PNP Chief can whip his organization into a credible–is it too much to say fearsome?–deterrent against unrestrained criminality, he would already have achieved what few, if any, have before him.