After bloody skirmishes happened last Friday between Malaysian security forces and Sultan Kiram’s “royal army†in Lahad Datu, the DFA triumphantly announced that the “standoff†was over. That was a hasty and ultimately erroneous conclusion — reflecting the DFA’s wishful thinking and not the facts on the ground.
Also reflecting the agency’s wishful thinking that Malaysia would happily do the hatchet job for us, the DFA described the skirmish as resulting from a police assault on the Filipino intruders. The Malaysian embassy called a late-night press conference to dispute the DFA’s characterization of what happened. The Malaysians maintain that Rajamuda Kiram’s men initiated the firefight.
Where is the DFA sourcing its information? All along, until the Malaysian ambassador called that press conference, everyone assumed our diplomatic establishment was getting its information from Malaysian authorities.
Last Sunday, the agency announced that a consular team from our embassy in Kuala Lumpur arrived in Lahad Datu town to look after the concerns of Filipino residents. That team is three weeks late. It should have been dispatched on first notice that a group of armed Tausugs landed in Sabah.
For more than three weeks, we did not have a consular team on the ground. The DFA was getting information second-hand. We had no diplomat available to negotiate with the armed Filipino group, perhaps to relay messages from the Office of the President. For three weeks, we had no one coordinating with Malaysian security forces to look after the best interests of Filipinos in the area, the armed group included.
The crisis may have ended earlier (and peacefully) if we had a consular team deployed near the line of confrontation — and if the Palace paid the crisis the executive focus it deserved. That is now academic. Blood has been shed. Malaysian security forces were humiliated and will want to get even. Kuala Lumpur is irritated and will tend towards draconian measures.
There are reports Filipinos residing in Sabah are being rounded up in the hundreds. Early last Sunday, a Filipino imam and his sons were reported shot to death by Malaysian police in Semporna town. All these are making Filipino residents in Sabah restive.
There are also reports that Tausog augmentation forces have crossed from Tawi-tawi to Sabah to support Rajamuda’s forces. For days, we were told that the Philippine Navy has sealed the maritime border precisely to prevent such augmentation from happening. Nevertheless, the augmentation appears to have happened.
There will be more blood. That is now unavoidable. Positions have hardened. Confidence evaporated.
The crisis was allowed to fester for too long. One could sense that the Malaysians were waiting for their cue from Manila. That did not come from the diffident (and yet imperious) Filipino leadership.
The other royal houses of Mindanao have rallied behind the Sultan of Sulu. Their power, like that of the Sultan, might have faded substantially over the years when secessionist movements dictated events but their residual influence still commands Manila’s respect. Manila failed miserably in assuring them that respect.
Because the situation at Lahad Datu was allowed to linger, things have become a lot more complicated. There are many undercurrents now in play and the matter requires deft political management. There is no one home, it seems, to do that job.
Partisan play
There are many things about that COA report on the use of pork barrel funds by legislators that may be considered rather odd.
First, the audit report covers the period 2008 to 2010. Yet, aspects of that report were released only last week, right smack in the middle of the campaign period.
Second, the audit found irregularities in the use of pork barrel funds by nearly all legislators — and certainly all the senators. Yet, only one component of the audit report, dealing with a questionable NGO and involving pork barrel funds from three senators and one congressman found airing in the media.
Third, the funding of the specific highlighted project using pork barrel funds was triggered by a recommendation from the Department of Agriculture (DA) through a government-owned corporation attached to that agency. The responsibility for ensuring proper use of the funds is with the DA, which supervises the public corporation attached to it. The legislators, from whose priority development assistance fund (PDAF) the money was sourced are many layers removed from the final project implementation.
Hardly surprising, some of the senators whose names were dragged into this controversy suspect the story is crafted for political effect.
Senate President Enrile is particularly aggrieved. Reviewing the process by which funds from his PDAF were allocated to a questionable end-user, the Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc. (PFI), he discovers signatures of some members of his staff were forged to make it appear the allocation was approved by his office.
The jaded will not be surprised by this. Syndicates involving fictitious NGOs proliferate in government agencies. They manage to divert not only funds allocated through the national budget but also funds lodged in the PDAF.
Surely the vulnerabilities of the PDAF system ought to be thoroughly reviewed, having been proven easy prey to vultures well-entrenched in the government agencies. Any inquiry, however, should be ultimately directed at the syndicates that proliferate in the agencies.
In the immediate term however, the Commission on Audit, an independent constitutional agency, must parry the accusation it has been coopted for partisan political play. The manner this particular audit report was presented to the public is clearly the handiwork of partisan operators.