Days ago, the foreign office forbade the inviting of Iraqi diplomats to official functions of the government. That was easy to explain, because whoever was throwing a party or inviting people to cocktails had the discretion of selecting the guests.
The foreign office also made it known that Iraqi diplomats accredited to Manila have been stripped of their usual immunity although they have been assured of protection during they stay.
Before that, the government declared certain Iraqi diplomats as persona non grata and sent them packing home. Was it coincidence that the US embassy complained earlier that the Iraqis had been spying on the Americans in Manila?
The Philippines did not send official notice that it was cutting diplomatic relations with Iraq. It would have been awkward to inform Baghdad of such extreme measure, because there was no decent reason for it.
As the US war rhetoric escalated last month and an attack became imminent, our ambassador to Baghdad simply closed the Philippine embassy in Iraq, leaving the premises to some non-diplomatic caretakers.
A state sometimes downgrades its embassy to show displeasure over some irritant or to dramatize a protest. Sometimes, it goes one step further and cuts diplomatic relations and closes the embassy altogether.
Did the closing of our embassy in Baghdad and the departure of our ambassador amount to a formal cut in diplomatic relations? Or were those moves merely dictated by the deterioration of the security situation in Baghdad?
The President was careful not to elaborate on the other announced objective of President George W. Bush of deposing Saddam, his counterpart, by force.
We were careful not to openly take sides until Bush, feeling isolated, published a list that included the Philippines of the nations whose leaders had assured him of their support.
We were wont to hide behind ambiguity, especially in the early days where a US victory was not yet certain. We had to tiptoe down a tight diplomatic rope as we did not want to jeopardize the safety and livelihood of 1.5 million Filipinos in the Middle East.
Before the appointment of an ambassador is announced, there is normally an agrement from the receiving government. Both sides want to avoid the embarrassing situation of a nominee being rejected by the host government.
A unilateral announcement is usually frowned upon. The normal practice is for the appointment and the acceptance being announced simultaneously by the sending and the receiving governments.
But how can such bilateral action come about, retired Ambassador Rodolfo Arizala asks, when there is no functioning government in Baghdad to accept the nominee and his credentials?
"This is not to question the qualifications of the new appointee," Arizala said. "I simply wonder to whom shall his letters of credence be addressed and to whom shall he present his credentials when there is no organized new government yet in Iraq or head of state or government. Will he present his Credentials to US retired Gen. Jay Garner designated by President Bush to take charge in Iraq with the downfall of Saddam Hussein?"
Strictly speaking, the legal regime on top of war-torn Iraq is still that of Saddam Hussein, his disappearance notwithstanding. The government and the constitution that defines basic legal processes in Iraq, including the changing of elective officials, have not been supplanted.
Pursing this legal fiction of the Saddam regime still existing, the ambassadors sent by Saddam to world capitals and accepted by the receiving states are still the legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people.
They have not been withdrawn by their government nor rejected by the host governments. There is a presumption of regularity in their tenure that mere media reports on the war cannot overturn.
When President Ferdinand Marcos fell in 1986 and the revolutionary government of Cory Aquino took over, the ambassadors and assorted diplomats sent by Marcos stayed on until they were replaced. To their credit, a number of them were retained.
In the absence of contrary instructions from the home office, the ambassadors had to stay on and not prematurely abandon their posts. Continuity was paramount.
While they are also alter egos of the head of government who had sent them, ambassadors in practice enjoy an official life span that can extend beyond the tenure of whoever dispatched them.
The background and training of soldiers may not commend them to the non-military situations they encounter daily in the streets and in citizen assemblies.
The ideal, of course, is to muster enough qualified Iraqis to handle the problems posed by their compatriots. But it takes time to gather and organize the locals.
The US is confronted with a problem on the ground that is proving to be far more difficult than just winning a war over a nation starved by more than a decade of embargo and softened for the final attack by massive bombing.
A significant development out there is that a number of houses and establishments have started to proudly (and defiantly?) display the Iraqi flag – as if in reaction to US soldiers going around town with the Stars and Stripes flying.