The Moro Islamic Liberation Front is hard-pressed to discipline an erstwhile high commander Ustadz Shariff Jullabi. The man had disclosed last month that fellow-separatists are using the cease-fire with the government to train recruits and fabricate antitank rockets. Irked, MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu disowned Jullabi as a mere member, not an officer that he claims to be. "Only our vice chairman for political affairs Gadzali Jaafar and myself are authorized to speak for the Front," Kabalu declared.
Jullabi persisted, insisting he was the duly-appointed commander for the MILFs Zamboanga-Sulu-Basilan front. As such, he said, he could speak for his area. And speak he did, insisting he had full control of the vast region in which Abu Sayyaf Islamic extremists also operate. As if to prove mastery of his terrain, he claimed that an Army Special Forces lieutenant, killed in battle with terrorists in Sulu late June, actually was shot by an aide who has gone AWOL.
This time the AFP Southern Command itself began to resent Jullabis provocations which they at first had chosen to ignore. Kabalu again chided him for "acting as spokesman of the Abu Sayyaf, with which the MILF has no ties." The government is mopping up remnants of the terror band in Sulu and Basilan that had funded its own separatist cause by kidnapping foreigners and locals. Throughout the kidnapping sprees, Jullabi would present himself as ransom negotiator, which surprised the authorities and embarrassed the MILF high command in Central Maguindanao. Kabalu had to cut him down to size.
Government peace negotiators appreciated Kabalus gallant efforts at confidence building in shutting up his talkative comrade. Soon reports filtered through MILF channels that Jullabi had been sacked as regional commander and spokesman. But the man defiantly met the news, saying he would continue the fight for Moro independence through his own "lost command." He also belittled the 17 interim agreements that the MILF has made so far with the government in the hope of a final peace settlement.
One of those accords was inked only last May 6 in Malaysia. It committed the government and the MILF to isolate and interdict "all criminal syndicates and kidnapping-for-ransom groups, including so-called lost commands operating in Mindanao."
Signed for Malacañang by presidential advisers Norberto Gonzales and Eduardo Ermita, and for the MILF by Lanang Ali and vice chairman for military affairs Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, the accord was met with hoots in Congress. Senators and congressmen felt that the government conceded police powers to the rebels, a step worse than earlier recognizing separatist camps and territories. "The AFP/PNP shall convey to the MILF an order of battle containing the names and identities of criminal elements, as defined in the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILFAgreement on Peace of 2001, suspected of hiding in MILF areas/ communities," the accord stated. "The MILF shall block the entry of criminals into MILF areas/ communities (and) may request the assistance of the AFP or PNP in the conduct of operations against such criminals inside MILF areas/ communities."
Gonzales had explained in Congress that the covenant was one of the best confidence-building measures ever arrived at with the rebels, since it contemplated joint efforts to curb criminality. The legislators were not so convinced. But weeks later, the MILF assisted soldiers in freeing a Korean treasure hunter from Pentagon gang kidnappers. The MILF is loath to admit it, but the gangmen were once their members, although expelled for banditry. Highlighted in the rescue was the rebels role in scaring the gang into turning over their hostage with no ransom paid.
Government troops are also pursuing Sulu pirates who have kidnapped three Indonesian seamen in Basilan waters. Should they venture into MILF "areas/communities" in the island-province, they may have to seek MILF permission to enter and conduct joint operations.
But then, Jullabi claims control of the area. Worse, he heads a lost command in the making. That command would soon become a headache not only for the MILF that resents insubordinates but also for the AFP and the PNP.
Lost commands got their name from insubordinates like Jullabi, but from the Moro National Liberation Front from which the MILF sprang. The MNLF had waged a separatist war since 1970 until it signed a peace settlement with the government in 1996. The peace talks with the MILF aim for a similar settlement, but there will be the usual remnant rebels who, for various reasons, do not want peace.
Jullabi is said to be wary of losing warlord control over his guerrilla front in case of a peace treaty. The cease-fire is currently in rehabilitation works for the return of Muslim evacuees from former war-torn villages. Such return to homes, and consequently to farms and other jobs, means less fighters for Jullabi to command.
Lost commanders eventually turn to banditry to feed their troops. They cannot get aid from usual foreign donors or subsidy from the central command. The AFP Southern Command would do well to monitor Jullabi, who might soon have no alternative funding source but kidnapping for ransom and extortion. The MILF would have to watch him too, if only to show its sincerity in the peace talks.
PNP Chief Supt. Oscar Calderon, officer-in-charge at the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, also wrote to say that he is investigating Col. Almario Hilario and men from the Camarines Sur and Albay police forces for involvement in robbery and kidnapping (Gotcha, 8 May 2002). As reported in this column, provincial jail detainee Nilo D. Almendral had detailed in a sworn affidavit the criminal activities he carried out for three years with no less than police officers.
Needless to say, we expect swift, complete action from Peralta and Calderon, to make our streets safe from abusive authorities.