‘Sharpshooters only need to disable him’

"They (Pasay City policemen) failed to read the hostage taker’s body movements. The hostage taker should have been neutralized when he made changes in his movement."

This was the striking observation made by lawyer and retired police Inspector Jaime Santiago, who served as head of the elite Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit of the Western Police District from 1995 to 1998.

According to Santiago, the policemen who responded to the hostage taking incident should have neutralized Diomedes Talbo when he made several sudden body movements and changed his grip on the 10-inch knife that he held to the body of four-year-old Dexter Balala.

It will be recalled that Talbo took Balala hostage on May 31 at the Philtranco bus terminal in Malibay, Pasay City. Talbo later stabbed Balala 13 times. He was later shot dead by responding policemen.

As a result of its failure to safely rescue Balala, the entire Pasay City police force led by its chief, Superintendent Eduardo dela Cerna, were ordered relieved by National Capital Regional Police Office Deputy Director General Edgardo Aglipay.

Irate bystanders later joined the melee and stomped on Talbo’s prone and bloodied body.

Television footage clearly showed Talbo holding the boy in one hand leaving his head and almost half of his abdomen open to police sniper fire. But no shot came.

The Balalas had just arrived from a two-week vacation in Camarines Sur and decided to wait for a 4 a.m. connecting ride to their hometown in San Fernando City, Pampanga at the Philtranco bus terminal on EDSA in Malibay, Pasay City.

Pasay police earlier said that they hesitated to shoot Talbo as he was moving around and feared that they might hit Dexter.

But according to Santiago, the moment Talbo started moving around, police should have neutralized him. "By neutralizing, I don’t mean killing him. Police only need to disable him. There were several times that he turned his back to the police. The policemen at the scene could have approached him and subdued him. If that was not possible, the snipers could have taken the shot," he said.

According to Santiago, it was considered as standard operating procedure for a SWAT team responding to a hostage situation to have snipers ready to take a shot at the hostage taker. He added that the SWAT tactical officer at the site should also be ready for any eventually.

"One false move, and the hostage taker should be neutralized. If during the negotiation, he inflicts harm on his hostage, the hostage taker should be taken down to keep the hostage safe. Members of the tactical team should not be afraid to fire at the hostage taker as a final option. We shoot not to kill but to protect the hostage," said Santiago.

Santiago said Talbo is an example of what police classify as a mentally imbalanced hostage taker which is considered the most dangerous and most commonly confronted by police.

"This type of a hostage taker is dangerous because of his unpredictable moves. He is always changing his movements. He may appear to negotiate but would still kill or harm the hostage," he said.

Santiago added that Talbo was also doubly dangerous as he was a classic case.

"It appears that he wanted to die but did not have the heart to kill himself. That is why he was provoking policemen at the scene to shoot. The policemen at the scene should have observed this and noted the changes in his behavior," he said.

The other types of hostage takers include the radical extremist, who may take people hostage for political reasons; and the criminal type who would take passersby hostage if trapped by police. Santiago said that the criminal type is the most easy to neutralize as they tend to surrender easily.

"They do not have the intent to kill. They only take hostages to buy time and plan their escape," he said.

As for negotiators, Santiago said elements of the SWAT team at the scene should not participate as they are also the ones to make the arrest if ever.

"If we will negotiate with the hostage taker and then arrest him, he might not trust us again should he stage another hostage take," he said.

During his time as SWAT chief of the WPD, Santiago was at the scene of 20 hostage takings. Of these incidents, five resulted in the death of the hostage takers after negotiations for the safe release of the hostages failed.

One such incident involved the hostage taking in 1995 of a five-month-old baby boy in Tondo by his uncle. Santiago said negotiations began when the drama started at 4 a.m. The suspect told police he would surrender but later went wild, forcing Santiago to shoot him in the head. It was all over by 9 a.m. with the safe rescue of the boy.

"Hostage takers usually take children hostage as they will not resist, are easy to handle and will not pose any danger to them (hostage takers)," Santiago said.

Santiago takes pride in the record of the WPD-SWAT in successfully handling all hostage situations in the city. He credited the success rate to the constant practices done by the unit such as those done during his term where WPD-SWAT elements were even trained by American policemen under the Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program of the US State Department.

As to why the Pasay policemen failed to neutralize Talbo, Santiago said it could either be due to lack of training or because of the fear of legal harassment and possible violation of the suspect’s human rights.

"The policemen could have taken the shot but hesitated out of fear that he will be facing a legal suit filed by the relatives of the hostage taker. It is quite unfortunate that the policeman does his job and faces an expensive legal battle later. Most of the time, policemen do not receive legal assistance from their units," he said.

As such, Santiago formed the Legal Assistance for Manila Policemen (LAMP) last year for such situations.

For a membership fee of just P1,000, Manila policemen can avail of the services of LAMP lawyers for minimal fees.