Washington gave formal notice to the Kremlin on Wednesday that US President Barack Obama will not be meeting one-on-one with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow before heading to the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg in early September. Claiming that there had not been enough progress on the bilateral front to justify a meeting, White House officials said Obama will instead make a two-day stopover in Sweden, a country White House Press Secretary Jay Carney went out of his way to describe as “a close friend and partner to the United States,†in contrast to Washington’s much less positive view of Moscow.
The snub should not come as a surprise. At the beginning of 2013, when we were working through our annual forecast, our analysts confronted the question of whether we can expect any real movement in negotiations between Russia and the United States. We re-examined the string of issues standing between Washington and Moscow, including proxy conflicts in the Middle East and economic and military competition in the Russian periphery, and compared those to the geopolitical environment we saw shaping up with a distracted Europe, opportunistic Russia and restrained United States. The resulting forecast was that there would not be a break in the US-Russian gridlock this year. The canceled meeting in Moscow certainly points in that direction.
Russia’s move to grant asylum to National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden added texture to the standoff as Russia tried to bolster its negotiating position with the United States, but the Snowden affair is a speck when we look at the bigger picture. There are a host of substantial issues standing between the United States and Russia, several of which will be discussed when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu arrive in Washington on Friday for talks with US Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. Putin will rely on Lavorv and Shoigu, two of his most trusted advisers, to keep a line of communication open with the United States, but a reliable read on where US-Russian relations stand is unlikely to be found in Washington.
One of the first places to look is the Middle East, where there is no shortage of conflicts for Russia to exploit in an effort to tie down the United States or drive Washington toward a deal. Russia can always vary the level of aid it provides to the Alawite regime in Syria, but Moscow doesn’t necessarily have the means to draw the United States into another war or, alternatively, enforce a solution to the sectarian conflict. Perhaps more revealing at this stage is Russia’s interactions with Iran now that the new Iranian leadership may be looking more seriously at a negotiation with the United States. Iran would welcome a diplomatic boost from Russia, in anything from rhetoric to potential weapons sales, to strengthen its own negotiating position with Washington. Russia would meanwhile want to edge its way into the negotiating process and subtly position itself to spoil any potential progress in negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
The Caucasus will be another magnet for US-Russian competition. With Georgia now cooperating more closely with Moscow, Russia has been investing more time in deepening its influence in Azerbaijan. Russia played a quiet role in an Azerbaijani decision to choose the Trans Adriatic Pipeline route over Nabucco West and is now discussing energy cooperation between Azerbaijan’s state-owned SOCAR and Russia’s Rosneft. On Tuesday, the same day Azerbaijan’s defense minister met with Hagel in Washington, a less noticed but equally critical meeting took place on the tactical level between Azerbaijan’s Minister of Defense Industry Yaver Jamalov, and a Russian delegation led by the director general of Tactical Missiles Corp., Boris Obsonov. Early next week, Putin is also supposed to be paying a visit to Baku to further discussions on energy and defense matters.
In Europe, we can expect a blend of showy military maneuvers and quiet economic deals out of Russia as Moscow tries to sustain its influence in European markets and undermine US relationships in the former Soviet periphery. Beginning in October, Russia and Belarus will stage Zapad (West) 2013, joint large-scale military exercises in both countries to demonstrate a military response to the deployment of a US ballistic missile shield in Europe. Not to be outdone, NATO will follow up in November with Steadfast Jazz — its own military exercises — on Russia’s doorstep, in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Against this backdrop, Russia will continue a highly selective investment strategy in Central and Eastern Europe to acquire strategic assets and build up its influence through commercial channels.
US moves will be less obvious in the coming months. While avoiding direct confrontation, the United States has tried to disengage from the conflicts that have sapped US strength over the past decade so that it can rebalance its foreign policy priorities. In this phase, Washington has not shown much willingness to move beyond gestures in dealing with its allies and adversaries while it recalibrates. Obama’s move to avoid a meeting with Putin fits with this strategy, but we also know where in the world to look if the United States starts to shift.