The law of evidence comprises of rules adopted for the measurement of probative force. It is preponderance of evidence in civil cases wherein the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. On the other hand in criminal cases, it is proof beyond reasonable doubt which means that the accused must be acquitted if there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt and this is consistent with the presumption of innocence in his favor.
During my incumbency as the Government Solicitor General, the Office encountered many criminal cases elevated on appeal because of conviction of the accused in the lower courts. The recognized process is that a crime is an offense against the People and so if a case is initiated against the accused its caption is entitled the “People of the Philippines vs. Accused”. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the prosecution of a criminal case in the Trial Court is done by the Prosecutors or Fiscals under the Department of Justice, Title III Chapter I, Section 3. However, when the case is appealed upon conviction of the accused, the Office of the Solicitor-General shall take over (Title III Chapter XII Section 35, RAC).
Once the case is brought on appeal, the appellate Courts, the Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court, send a notice to the Solicitor General requiring its comment on the case under appeal. The preparation of this Comment as required entails a review of the records and proceedings in the Trial court which handed down its judgment of conviction and upon such review the Solicitor-General recommends either affirmance or reversal of the judgment. This phase of work is a sensitive one due in fact to the appellate Courts’ reliance on the findings or recommendations of the Office of the Solicitor-General. Indeed records will show that there were instances when the recommendation of reversal by the OSG had been adopted by the appellate Courts. During my time as Solicitor-General, I repeatedly warned the handling Solicitors in the Office to read and study carefully the records of the case before giving their recommendations and the process in the Office will require the Assistant Solicitor-Generals (ASG) to review the findings of the handling Solicitor apart from my own study of the same. In those cases, when the handling Solicitor and the ASG would recommend reversal of the lower Courts’ judgment this recommendation is subjected to further review by my immediate staff before I affixed my signature. The point is that I kept reminding my staff who are tempted to recommend a reversal of the conviction in the lower Court about the settled rulings in many cases (US vs. Claro 32 Phil. 413; US vs. Samonte 20 Phil. 157; US vs. Mendez 19 Phil. 28, etc.) wherein it was repeatedly held that “Where there is a conflict in the testimony of witnesses in a criminal action, those of the defense giving evidence directly contradicting that given by those of the prosecution, the appellate Court on Appeal will not interfere with the conclusions of the trial Court concerning the credibility of witnesses in view of the fact that the Trial Court saw them in the act of testifying and observed their manner and demeanor as witnesses, unless it is satisfactory shown that the Trial Court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and influence sufficient to induce the belief that, if the error had not been committed, the decision on the question would probably have been different”. Otherwise stated, Trial Judges have vastly superior advantages over the ascertainment of truth and the detection of falsehood over Courts of review.
Concerning the Webb et al case, the records will show that the judgment of conviction handed down by the lower Court was appealed to the Court of Appeals and the Solicitor-General was given the opportunity to give or issue its comments on the judgment of conviction. In both instances, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and the OSG likewise supported the same but the Supreme Court saw it the other way. In its ruling of acquittal, the High Court found “a reasonable, lingering doubt as to the guilt of the accused”. This doubt obviously arose due to the inconsistent and contradictory testimony of witness Alfaro. It maybe pertinent at this point to highlight the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Martin Villarama who disagreed with his colleagues that Alfaro’s testimony was “inherently incredible and that she was not a credible prosecution witness”. He likewise cited the Tribunal’s previous decision which held that “Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible witness”.