That fierce battle going on in Patikul, Sulu is odd in every way. Both sides absorbed substantial casualties and there is every indication this engagement will continue in a brutal war of attrition.
Both the military and the police have not been helpful at all in helping us understand why this battle happened. They seem to know very little themselves and have equally opted to play the humiliating role of fence-sitters.
It is difficult to verify information coming out of the deepest recesses of the forest. All we are sure of is that armed units of the MNLF have begun an assault on what is believed to be the main Abu Sayyaf base.
The MNLF put out its own version of the body count, admitting losses in its ranks but putting the enemy’s losses at about twice theirs. MNLF spokesmen announced midweek that their forces have overrun the main bandit encampment, suggesting their fighters have now shifted from a siege to a mopping up operation. They likewise announced the offensive liberated foreign hostages held by the bandit group — although they have yet to produce evidence of this.
This is the first time, if I recall correctly, that a major gun battle erupted between the MNLF and the Abu Sayyaf. The bandit group heretofore thrived under the protective shadow of the remnant armed force of the MNLF. The fighters on both sides are relatives and friends. Until this week, they coexisted in the same Tausog communities famed for their warlike traditions — and for respecting the code of honor among warriors.
The firefight must have been provoked by a truly grievous offense. Whatever that might be, no one seems willing to talk about.
There are rumors the pocket war is linked to ransom delivered in exchange for the life of a Jordanian journalist held by the bandits for seven months now (and generally left in that condition by the military and the police). At any rate, there has been no authoritative comment on this rumor.
The Palace reacted to reports of the outbreak of fighting by adamantly denying it asked the MNLF to go after the bandits. It is unlikely, in any case, that the MNLF would go to battle as a Malacanang surrogate. There was really no need for the Palace denial.
Why there was such haste (and such insistence) in that denial raises more questions, however. Lest we need to be reminded, the Abu Sayyaf is an avowed enemy of the state. The enemy of my enemy should be my friend.
As if taking the Palace cue, the AFP announced it was not participating in the battle. Its units are commanded purely to protect the civilian communities displaced by the firefight. The police, which has principal responsibility for rescuing hostages and suppressing banditry, has said nothing so far.
Thus we have this strange situation. The Philippine state has chosen to step aside while two non-state armed groups try to annihilate each other.
If the MNLF fighters could so easily overrun a bandit camp, why couldn’t the AFP and the PNP do it? If they do manage to free the hostages, wouldn’t this be and embarrassment for the state forces?
By the way, what is the legal standing of the MNLF armed units? Under the terms of the 1996 agreement, these units were supposed to have been demobilized and those qualified integrated into the AFP.
Has the MNLF now become an independent armed force within the folds of a sovereign republic?
Postponed
The public seethed and the Palace stepped back: the plan to begin excavating Edsa next May has been postponed indefinitely.
The reasons for the postponement are the very same ones we raised in our last column: upgrade the secondary roads; make sure the rehabilitation of Edsa will not coincide with the construction of the NLEX-SLEX connector road (and, it turns out, the construction of the NLEX-North Harbor road which has commenced); deal with the buses; and upgrade the MRT (including finally closing the loop with LRT1).
All the preconditions to constricting Edsa are commonsensical. It is really a wonder all the common sense considerations were missed in the calculations of the DPWH.
Now, our officials are talking more sense. Terminals will be built at both ends of Edsa so that provincial buses will not have to roll into the congested avenue. The aging buses plying Edsa will be weeded out.
Still, nothing has been said about why the MRT-LRT loop has not been closed by building that station across the SM North Avenue complex. Now we are told that it might take two years for new MRT coaches to be procured and delivered.
Which raises a rather important question: what has the DOTC been doing under Mar Roxas and then under Jun Abaya?
The plan to procure new wheels for the existing (and wobbly) MRT coaches and new coaches to increase frequency was on the table since 2010. Why is it that nothing was done to improve convenience for the rail commuters, introduce a common ticketing system and upgrade the stations?
Now we are told it will take two years for the MRT to be ready for the commuter overflow caused by the rehab of Edsa. It will probably take as long to build the terminals for provincial buses and just as long to weed out the rolling coffins plying the route.
If DPWH cannot do the Edsa facelift in time for the big 2014 international meetings in Manila, blame it on the lackluster performance of the DOTC.