Those who wanted to see the Senate as the destructive epicenter of rabble-rousing are now calling the emerging majority in that chamber a “mongrel.” That is such an uninformed caricature.
The emerging Senate majority, centered around Sen. Manuel Villar, has now grown to decisive mass. It counts in its ranks seven incumbent senators often described as the “pro-administration bloc.” But it also includes several of the new senators who ran in the opposition ticket (as did Villar himself) as well as Jinggoy Estrada.
In terms of party affiliation, one might call this a rainbow coalition of sorts. It includes the senators from the Lakas, one from the Liberal Party, one from the Nacionalista party, another from the NPC, two independents and the two senators from Joseph Estrada’s PMP.
But that is not remarkable. As a matter of tradition, elected senators leave their party affiliations at the Senate door and enter the chamber as independent minds. Most of them, in the strange manner our elections have been configured, were elected into office with more votes than the President of the Republic.
Fidel Ramos, for instance, was elected to the presidency with a 24% plurality in a multi-candidate race. The winning threshold for a seat in the Senate is somewhere in the vicinity of 33%.
That magnifies even more the imperiousness that historically goes with a seat in a legislative chamber elected at large — and at great expense.
Within the framework of the 1987 Charter, the presidency is weaker than it was under the 1935 Constitution. The only way it can exercise some leverage over the Senate is to withhold the honorable senators’ share of the pork — largely by appearing to have inadvertently lost their requests in the paperwork.
On the other hand, the Senate may overturn the Chief Executive’s preference by refusing to ratify treaties (as in the case of the great bases debate of 1991). The Senate can torpedo the administration’s legislative agenda. Its members at the powerful Commission on Appointments may block presidential nominees to the various government portfolios, to the general rank in the armed forces and to ambassadorial ranks.
We see that today. In the present Cabinet, only the Education Secretary, a former congressman, has been confirmed by the CA.
Too, senators may exert great political pressure on the presidency by over-exercising their oversight functions, summoning officials of the executive branch to interminable hearings. We saw that in the Drilon Senate, so much so that scandal-mongering took its toll on the chamber’s legislative productivity. In exasperation, the President issued an order limiting the appearance of her officials in hearings — justified on the principle of executive privilege.
There is no single factor that defines alliances in the Senate. The alliances may shift based on the legislative issues at hand. Alliances may also be formed based on interpersonal chemistry. The Wednesday Group, for instance, is held together not by any ideological position but by the ease with which its members could dine and chat regularly. By contrast, it would be improbable for Juan Ponce Enrile and Jamby Madrigal or Joker Arroyo and Panfilo Lacson to sit together for a meal and enjoy it.
Then, too, there is that immeasurable factor of stature in the scale of legislative statesmanship. There is no comparison, for instance, between an Enrile or an Angara on one hand and a Madrigal or a Trillanes on the other. In the sport of boxing, they would be on very different weight divisions.
Simply said, some are smarter than others. Respect cannot be bought. No amount of money Madrigal might be willing to throw around will cure her situation.
In what has been intended as a chamber of statesmen, the respect of one’s colleagues is an important variable in winning leadership of the chamber.
At the present time, though, the single most important factor defining the line of division in the chamber appears to be presidential ambition. That has made irreconcilable senators who otherwise have little disagreement on matters of policy or on the definition of national interest.
It is an open secret that both Manuel Villar and Mar Roxas are setting up for the 2010 presidential contest. Control of the Senate presidency by Villar will enable him an amount of political leverage that could injurious to Roxas’ own political effort.
That is the only likely explanation why Roxas is on the other side of the fence from Villar, in the unhappy company of Lacson and Legarda who both have the potentials for becoming presidential or vice-presidential players in 2010. In the back trenches, against a decisive majority in the chamber, they have found themselves in each other’s embrace.
The situation puts the LP in even direr straits. Should Roxas make a run for the presidency, he will likely take in Noynoy Aquino as his running mate. Kiko Pangilinan, a rising political star, is now rumored to be Villar’s pick for running mate. Which explains why this erstwhile LP senator, who ran as independent the last time around, has broken from his LP colleagues in the fight for the Senate presidency.
Alas, Loren must cozy up to Ping Lacson if she plans to be vice-president.
Alan Cayetano reported a conversation he had with Francis Escudero in a recent interview. Escudero reportedly said that if the opposition’s attempt to take command of the Senate crumbled so pathetically, it is because that camp is so devastatingly divided by personal ambitions and self-interests. Nothing binds them enough to overcome what divides them.
Those who handily call the emerging Senate majority a “mongrel” ought to take a hard look at the probable minority. There they will find, among allies who might sooner be at each other’s necks, an even uglier mongrel.