These are among the principal functions of a peacetime army. Trained for disciplined, coordinated action, used to working even under the harshest conditions and in the most inhospitable terrain, soldiers are well-suited for disaster relief operations. The AFP, however, is stretched thin. Already undermanned, its members not only are engaged in peacetime military operations but must also fight enemies of the state: Islamic extremists and communist insurgents. In conflict areas, military engineers and personnel are also the ones undertaking development projects.
The AFP has had to risk the ire of bratty politicians by pulling out soldiers serving as bodyguards of VIPs for redeployment to conflict areas. But even with all bodyguard services of soldiers terminated, the AFP can provide only so much assistance during disasters. The AFP cannot afford to pull out troops from the battlefield for relief work.
Other countries call on reservists during calamities. The country’s experience with Milenyo and previous natural calamities should prompt policy-makers to consider proposals to boost recruitment for the AFP’s reserve force. There are also proposals to revive compulsory participation in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, with amended rules and safeguards to prevent the type of abuse that led to the abolition of the ROTC. The proposal must not be dismissed outright.
Unlike paramilitary units, whose regular function is to assist the AFP in counterinsurgency operations in the countryside, reservists can be limited to purely civilian rescue and relief operations. That task is nothing to sneeze at. As we have seen during Milenyo’s rampage, even one fallen branch cleared from a blocked thoroughfare can bring immense relief to motorists. As power executives noted after the typhoon, restoring electricity would have been quicker if there were more people clearing uprooted trees and toppled electric poles. The country can use a larger reserve force with sufficient training to undertake disaster relief work at a moment’s notice.