Since March 1980, Hermie was occupying a portion of a 1,399 square meter parcel of land owned by four brothers all surnamed Bausa who allowed him to construct a small house of light materials thereon and to use it for ten years at a nominal annual rental of P100 only considering their close relationship. After the expiration of the ten-year period, the Bausa brothers demanded the return of the occupied portion and the removal of his house but Hermie refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property.
Hence, on May 21, 1991, the Bausa brothers filed a complaint against Hermie for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" seeking to oust Hermie from the premises of the subject property and restore upon themselves the ownership and possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses "in amounts justified by the evidence".
On July 2, 1991, Hermie filed his Answer. He alleged ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2, 1980 executed by a certain Tomas del la Cruz with the knowledge and conformity of the brothers.
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On November 18, 1997, the Bausas rested their case. Thereafter Hermie started testifying in direct examination by his lawyer. However, on June 24, 1998, Hermie died without completing his evidence. On August 4, 1998, his lawyer withdrew as counsel because his services were terminated by Hermie Jr. On September 22, 1998 or more than seven years after the filing of the answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel, Hermie’s heirs raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction in a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that the Bausas failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees. Was the motion proper?
No. The new lawyer of Hermie’s heirs should have first filed a formal substitution of the parties within 30 days from date of death of Hermie as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the person of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. Thus proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against Hermie or that he did not authorize the new lawyer to represent him. Strictly speaking therefore, before compliance by the new lawyer of the substitution of parties required by the said rule, he had no standing in the trial court when he filed his motion to expunge the complaint from the record and to annul all the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of the correct docket fees (Heirs of Betuldo Hinog vs. Melicor et. al. G.R. 140954, April 12, 2005. 455 SCRA 460).