The case involves the charge of estafa filed by a bank in September 1997 against several accused. After preliminary investigation, the Investigating Fiscal recommended the filing of the Information against the accused. Two of the cases were raffled in the sala of this Judge in Cabanatuan City (respondent).
The accused however appealed the findings of the Investigating Fiscal to the Department of Justice (DOJ) on December 28, 1998. But on August 15, 2000, the DOJ denied the appeal and the motion for reconsideration of such denial filed by the accused. Hence the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against the accused fixing no bail.
On November 20, 2000, the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest. On December 4, 2000, the judge granted the motion without any hearing thereon and without furnishing a copy of the motion to the complainant bank. Thus a reinvestigation was conducted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. On December 28, 2000, the Assistant Prosecutor reversed the earlier findings of the Investigating Fiscal finding probable cause to charge the accused of estafa. On the same day the assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information. The next day, December 29, 2000, the Judge perfunctorily granted the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the release of the accused. Was the Judge correct?
No. The undue haste and perfunctory dismissal of the case was not based on the judge’s own evaluation or assessment of the evidence (or lack thereof) against the accused. Settled is the legal doctrine that the discretion to accede to a Motion to Dismiss filed by the prosecutor rests solely with the court (Dimatulac vs. Villon 297 SCRA 679; Roberts Jr. vs. CA 254 SCRA 307; public vs. Sunga 162 SCRA 191; Dungog vs. CA 159 SCRA 145; Crespo vs. Mogul 151 SCRA 462). Mere approval of the position taken by the prosecution is not equivalent to the discretion required in cases like this (Mosquera v. Panganiban 258 SCRA 473 citing Martinez v. CA 237 SCRA 575). The trial judge must be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. Such a conclusion can be arrived at only after a thorough assessment of the prosecution evidence. For a valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion, accepting the prosecution’s word that the evidence is insufficient is not enough; strictly required of the order disposing of the motion is the trial judge’s own evaluation of such evidence. Once a complaint or an information is filed in court, the judge – not the prosecutor – assumes full control of the controversy (Solar v. How, 338 SCRA 511). Thus, a grant of the motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself, a subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
Furthermore, when the respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest without bail against all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the Information and the resolution of the prosecutor and agreed with the latter’s findings of probable cause. Consequently, the grant of the motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged insufficiency of evidence posed a serious contradiction to the earlier finding of probable cause. Besides, as held in Edillon vs. Narvios 99, SCRA 174, allowing reinvestigation by the prosecution should be discouraged or should not be tolerated, because such a practice would generate the impression that the accused would be able to fix the case or that it would be easier for them to manipulate and maneuver the dismissal of the case in the prosecutor’s office.
So the judge in this case is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and correspondingly penalized (Community Rural Bank vs. Talavera A.M. RTJ-05-1909, April 6, 2005. 455 SCRA 34)