Yet not too long ago, Rockwell Land Corp. officials were sweating buckets as they tried to meet their timetable to turn a retired power plant into a high-end complex of shops and condominiums. The main obstacle to their best laid plans: a deadly pond of toxic waste that had been produced by the 40-year-old, 130-megawatt thermal power plant once operated by the Lopez-owned Manila Electric Co. (Meralco).
Today, Rockwell claims that the problem has been solved. But just 10 minutes’ drive from this newest playground of the rich is Barangay San Joaquin in Pasig City where, environmentalists and toxicologists claim, lies Rockwell’s dirty secret.
Entombed in reinforced concrete underneath a parking area the size of four basketball courts in lower-middle class San Joaquin are 4,300 cubic meters of soil and 14 cubic meters of liquids from Rockwell. The soil and liquids were contaminated with cancer-causing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which had been used for Rockwell’s power plant transformers. PCBs are considered so toxic that their manufacture was banned worldwide in the 1970s.
Only in July, when a TV report on the wastes was aired, did San Joaquin’s residents learn that they have been living with this toxic refuse for almost two years now. Environmental activists and experts, meanwhile are criticizing the manner in which Rockwell and the government "solved" the center’s poisonous problem, saying it was merely transferred to another, less prosperous, community.
When released into the environment, PCBs do not biodegrade. From the soil, they can go up the food chain to affect animals and people. PCBs can cause cancer through frequent skin contact, ingestion through the food chain, or inhalation of dust coated with the chemical. It is one of the few toxic substances that can poison babies through their mothers’ breastmilk.
Rockwell Land says that "only a catastrophic event" could bring on the collapse of the PCB tomb and contaminate its surroundings. It argues that this is unlikely to happen; therefore, the people of San Joaquin are safe. Moreover, says Rockwell, its disposal project was properly reviewed and approved by government. It had gone through "the eye of a needle," adds the company, even if it had been "more proactive" in finding a solution like no other company with the same problem ever had.
"The point," says Rockwell president Nestor Padilla, "is that here is a company that did something about it."
But experts like Dr. Romeo Quijano of the Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology of the University of the Philippines remain unconvinced that Rockwell – and the government – did all that could be done. Quijano visited San Joaquin just over a week ago. He says that because the area is prone to flooding, it is an improper site for the disposal of toxic wastes. Even if the PCB tomb had been waterproofed, Quijano adds, "There is no guarantee it will not leach out."
Cement is porous, he says, and it cannot completely contain volatile chemicals like PCBs. "That leaks out, even just little by little," says the expert, who stresses that PCBs are very potent. "You don’t need a lot to cause a lot of harm."
In fact, the PCB graveyard there – located inside a small compound of Meralco – is only 25 meters from the Pasig River. It is also within the Marikina Valley floodplain that is prone to liquefaction, or the softening of the soil that may cause the movement of the containment. And it is only 2.5 kilometers from the active West Valley Fault.
Rockwell Land’s own Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) contains these data, which is probably why the five-member committee that reviewed it found several gaps and had asked for several tests to be done by the company at the site. As review committee member Gil Cardiel, a geological engineer recalls, "I found the physical environment to be not conducive to the project."
The review committee was formed by the DENR’s Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) in accordance to regulations. The committee was able to conduct five meetings with Rockwell Land executives and consultants. But even after the fifth meeting last December 11, the reviewers remained unconvinced of the soundness of Rockwell’s proposal.
Then EMB Director Peter Abaya asked a government geologist to look into the proposal. Mario Aurelio of the Lands Geological Survey Division, in written comments to Abaya, said Rockwell’s EIA was "inadequately researched as far as geology is concerned." He also said significant parts of the EIA were "laden with presumptive claims but fails to substantiate."
Cardiel believed that the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the PCB disposal project should be denied unless Aurelio’s recommendations related to the earthquake and flooding risks were met. The structure was going to be the first such facility to be built in the country, and the reviewers wanted Rockwell to show its integrity. Environmental activists have recorded a number of cases in other countries where similarly lined landfills keeping toxic and hazardous waste leaked over time, causing damage to health and the environment.
Another review committee member, university professor Nestor Castro, also recommended the denial of the ECC. An anthropologist, Castro had repeatedly needled Rockwell to at least let the Pasig community in on its plans. He says, "There was no compliance with social acceptability requirements whatsoever," referring to government rules that such projects be subject to public hearings.
The committee, however, never got to submit its final recommendation on the project. Even while its members were waiting for another meeting to be called, then DENR chief Antonio Cerilles signed the ECC on January 16, just nine days before a new secretary took over his post.
When asked why he did not call for another meeting after Rockwell gave the additional technical information, Abaya says he felt "it would just end up being approved."
But Castro says, "Abaya read us wrong. I don’t think we would have approved it." Cardiel for his part says that the absence of a final report from the review committee makes the ECC "null and void." A review committee issues a chairman’s report that will contain its recommendation on a project. The EMB director can either uphold or veto this recommendation.
Abaya insists it was a decision that had to be made. "More than anything, the issue here is health," he says. "I wasn’t willing to spend too much time." The ECC was drafted on January 10 when, he says, he determined that "the information was suitable to make a decision." Abaya felt the search for a final disposal solution to the contaminated materials had already taken too long.
Between 1996 and 1999, Rockwell Land had tested three methods to get rid of the contaminated materials, in attempts to comply with DENR instructions to complete treatment by March 1999. All three – chlorination, soil-washing, and thermal desorption – did not work. By August that year, only about eight percent of the PCBs had been destroyed.
By then the company had spent close to P100 million trying to get rid of the PCBs. This was excluding the considerable amount Rockwell Land had spent years earlier to ship pure PCB oils to the United Kingdom for incineration.
Yet Rockwell Land’s Padilla says they were still willing to find a solution. But with the development of the complex in full swing and residential units already being pre-sold, treating the materials at the site was apparently becoming a headache. As Rockwell would say later in its own EIA: ". . . (N)one of the alternative (treatment methods earlier explored) were able to meet the cleanup criteria and/or meet the schedule needed in order to coincide with site development."
Padilla himself recalls telling Abaya, "We don’t mind if it takes five years, but can we move it out of Rockwell?"
But, according to Padilla, they could not afford to ship out the contaminated soil and liquids for incineration. He says this would have cost Rockwell Land another P400 million. "We would have been broke," says Padilla, whose company had a net income of P402 million in 1999, out of total revenues of P2.5 billion.
Abaya says he agreed to allow the transfer of the waste from Rockwell because of "health concerns." While the EMB safeguarded the health of Rockwell residents, it transferred the hazard to San Joaquin and its 18,000 people.
Moreover, before Rockwell was allowed to encapsulate the contaminated soil and liquids, these sat relatively exposed inside the Meralco warehouse in San Joaquin, the soil in a huge heap and the liquids in drums. For more than a year, workers went in and out of the warehouse, unaware of what was in their midst.
Meralco employees who worked on the transport of the materials say they were not told they were handling toxic waste. The workers were given respiratory masks, but not protective suits or gloves, which are required in internationally accepted protocols for handling PCB-contaminated materials.
Quijano warns that these workers face real dangers to their health: "A single exposure can load your body with enough amount of toxins that can significantly increase your risk to harm associated with PCBs."
Castro recalls "getting the sense" that Rockwell representatives tended to be "impatient," especially when pressed about community consultations. Wonders Greenpeace Southeast Asia campaign director Von Hernandez: "If they were so sure about the technology, why couldn’t they tell the people?"
Rockwell’s Padilla says, "I think it goes to the very nature of the problem. It’s very difficult to talk to my child about my problems in the office if my child does not fully appreciate the complexity of the problem."
But EIA experts say this is exactly why the rules involve the public in the process. Public discussions give the proponent a chance to explain the project. Environmental lawyer Marvic Leonen of the University of the Philippines Law Center remarks, "When you are required by law to explain, it’s not a reason to say it’s unexplainable."
He adds, "The EIA process halts the businessman and tells you to look, other than at the cost and revenue, at the environment. And broader than the environmental concerns, the social aspect of the project."
But Abaya says the review committee had agreed that the social acceptability requirement be reduced. This meant Rockwell Land could push through with the encapsulation of San Joaquin but that it should do a public perception survey.
Castro denies they agreed to such. "Precisely why it’s called a perception survey," he says. "There must be a gauge of public acceptance."
Padilla remembers it this way: The EMB agreed that if they could get a clearance from the barangay captain, then they could go ahead. In November 2000, Rockwell Land got an endorsement from San Joaquin Barangay Captain Gaudencio Adlawan.
Adlawan says a Meralco official did come to his office – with a prepared letter that he was to copy on a barangay council letterhead and sign. He admits doing as he was told, but says he never understood what the "polychlorinated biphenyls" in that clearance meant. It was only when a reporter from GMA Channel 7 came to interview him, Adlawan says, that he realized there was toxic waste in his backyard. He says "Nilinlang ako (I was tricked). If I knew that was harmful I wouldn’t have signed it."
Meralco information officer Elpi Cuna, however, dismisses Adlawan’s claim as "iwas-pusoy," merely a move to escape blame.
On July 19, the EMB issued Rockwell a notice saying it violated seven of 20 conditions set in its January 2001 ECC for the PCB disposal project. These included Rockwell’s failure to submit a geological hazard test before implementing the project, conduct a survey in the host barangay to at least list down their concerns and set up a guarantee fund for future possible damages.
The EMB gave Rockwell Land seven days to respond. As of last week, the company Rockwell had yet to do so.
Current DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez has formed a team to study the matter. He says he would give Rockwell Land the opportunity to explain why its ECC should not be cancelled. He adds that he also wants "to see whether a process has been skipped" in the EIA process undergone by Rockwell.
In the meantime, toxicologist Quijano suggests installing a monitoring scheme for the project, including periodic sampling of the surrounding soil to determine if the contaminated materials are leaching.
Otherwise, he warns, "over time, the PCBs will leach into the Pasig River, to the Manila Bay, and the effects will be far beyond Pasig."