To strengthen the mandatory character of the pre-trial in a criminal case, if the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear and has no acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may now impose proper sanctions or penalties. Further, the Revised Rules reiterate that, after the pre-trial, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated and the evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
The Revised Rules also reiterate the requirement of a pre-trial agreement and that the same must be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel in order that the same may be used against the accused. The Revised Rules added that such agreement covering the matters considered during the pre-trial shall be approved by the court.
It is interesting to note that in the past, even prior to the old rules on criminal procedure which preceded the Revised Rules, a stipulation of facts was not allowed in criminal cases. In the case of US vs. Donato, 9 Phil 701, the Supreme Court held that agreements between attorneys for the prosecution and for the defense in criminal cases, by which it is stipulated that certain witnesses, if present, would testify to certain facts prevent a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court and are in violation of the law. In a later case, the Supreme Court reiterated the impropriety and impermissibility of rendering judgment in a criminal case on the basis of such an agreement rather than on any evidence being adduced for testimony taken from witnesses, as such practice defeats the purposes of criminal law, and is an open violation of the rules of criminal procedure. The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime and may not be relieved of this obligation by the mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a matter constitutive of an essential element of the crime charged (People vs. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 36).
The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements was reiterated in the case of US vs. Manlimos, 11 Phil, 547. There, the Supreme Court said that it is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to predict what a proposed witness would say under the sanction of his oath and the test of cross-examination.
Of course, under the Revised Rules, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now expressly allowed by law, particularly during pre-trial. In fact, as stated in People vs. Hernandez, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of facts made by the parties during the trial itself of a criminal case has long been allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties. Thus, although the requirement is for an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused, the Supreme Court ruled in the afore-cited case that where the stipulation of facts was made during trial and therefore automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court, the conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary. Another reason for its ruling, according to the Supreme Court, is that the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which may be waived. Hence, a stipulation of facts or judicial admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution was precisely in the nature of such waiver.
Another case pertinent to the subject of pre-trial in a criminal case is People vs. Webb, 312 SCRA 573. There, the principal issue was whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case. The Supreme Court, disagreeing with the Court of Appeals, quoted the definition of an oral deposition to be a pre-trial discovery device by which one party through his attorney asks oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the other party, which is conducted under oath outside of the court room. Further, the purposes of taking depositions, as noted by the Supreme Court, are, among others, to expedite litigation, prevent delay, simplify and narrow the issues, facilitate both preparation and trial, educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements. Thus, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. Supporting this is American jurisprudence to the effect that the rules on criminal practice, particularly on the defense of alibi, which is the accused main defense, state that when a person intends to rely on such defense, the accused must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
(The author is a senior partner of the Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRALAW). She may be contacted at tel. #: 830-8000; fax #: 894-4697; or e-mail: accra@accralaw.com)