‘Vote selling’ a lousy alibi to withhold ballot receipt

Glib talk won’t allay fears of rigging in Comelec’s first-ever overseas online voting. Only sincerity will.

Online voters in 77 foreign posts echoed one suspicion. Upon submitting their ballots by mobile, tablet or computer, they were given a QR code. The landing page then displayed some of the names they selected and most of those they didn’t.

They felt ripped off. Comelec’s infomercials never mentioned that odd feature.

In usual fast-talk, Comelec Chairman George Garcia claimed that’s to prevent vote buying and selling. They purposely didn’t issue voter receipts so politicos and electors can’t transact business. It’s unlike in-country voting where machines spit out a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).

That’s a shallow excuse. A determined vote-seller can always screenshot his filled-up ballot before casting. Or video himself submitting it, as proof to the politico-buyer.

In fact, a complainer in Singapore posted on Facebook such ballot screenshot. He ranted that the QR code differed from it.

Garcia babbled about a supposed security feature known only to Comelec. Selected candidates are represented alphanumerically, then mixed with the unselected ones.

“They will not see the names of the candidates that they actually voted for because this can be used in vote-buying,” he claimed. “Once these encrypted codes are translated into human-readable language after the end of election hours on May 12th, that’s when they will confirm that the votes they cast are for the correct candidates.”

Does the average online voter comprehend such gobbledygook?

Comelec’s frequently asked questions states:

“How guaranteed is the integrity, given that even with manual voting there can be tampering? What about internet voting?

“When it comes to accuracy, internet voting is secure and virtually free from tampering. A verification system allows voters to check if their votes have been changed, altered or lost. Any alterations will be visible.

“Voters can monitor this at any time using a provided hash code. The system features three layers of authentication and live capturing for added security. The technology to be used is advanced, and even IT experts can confirm that your vote remains unaltered.”

Garcia’s blather and Comelec’s webpost appear to contradict. How can the online voter know if his selected candidate was altered or not if it’s in numbers and letters that only Comelec knows?

Was there even an end-to-end demo of the online voting system to publicly explain the supposed encryption-decryption method?

Another question: assume that the online voter is magically able to discern her/his candidates’ alphanumeric codes. What’s the guarantee that her/his ballot will be counted?

Comelec has a credibility problem. Its automated elections system is opaque. It didn’t help any that Garcia downplayed the doubtful online voting by pointing to “unfortunate misinformation being spread on the internet.”

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Still another question: Why didn’t Comelec provide for a VVPAT or voter’s receipt in the online voting system? The 2007 Automated Election Systems Law or RA 9369 required such receipt to be issued by voting machines:

“Minimum System Capabilities – The AES must at least have the following functional capabilities: (e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail.”

Comelec disobeyed that law in Election 2010 and 2013. The Supreme Court compelled it to enforce the VVPAT in 2016.

All overseas voting systems fall under the AES Law. Initially it was by mail. Then, and up to now in 16 stations, voters have to go to embassies and consulates. Voting machines there print out receipts upon swallowing the cardboard ballots.

Comelec cannot just alibi that this can’t be done with online voting. The law is harsh, but it is the law.

Comelec insists on full automation, which is opaque and unreliable. Thus, it must go whole hog and adopt VVPAT in online voting.

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That is the demand of 141 retired AFP and PNP generals, clerics, businessmen, professionals and civil society leaders.

Banded under ANIM (Alyansa ng Nagkaka-Isang Mamamayan), they asked Comelec to:

(1) Immediately suspend online voting for overseas Filipinos and restore the VVPAT feature that reflects the actual votes, with end-to-end vote verifiability;

(2) If the above cannot be done, then allow manual counting at the precinct level, after the automated election procedure in the precinct has been completed, as mandated under Section 31 of RA 9369;

 (3) Allow independent third-party audits by civil society representatives, elections watchdogs and cybersecurity experts.

Among the petitioners are former AFP and PNP chiefs and major service commanders and bishops.

(See growing list of signatories: https://tinyurl.com/Demand-Letter-to-Comelec)

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